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Abstract
This paper studies how an improved information environment a¤ects consumer
search and rm competition. We nd conditions for information improvement to
have unambiguous impacts on search duration, price, and consumer welfare. In
many cases consumers benet from information improvement regardless of how it
a¤ects the market price, but there are also cases where information improvement
raises price signicantly so that consumers su¤er from it. Our model provides a
unied way to consider the market implications of various types of information
improvement such as search advertising, personalized recommendation, ltering,
and new display technology.
Key words: consumer search, price competition, information improvement
1 Introduction
Over the past two decades consumers have experienced a signicantly improved in-
formation environment in their shopping process. For example, they often use online
platforms to gather product information such as search engines (e.g. Google), prod-
uct comparison websites (e.g. Expedia), and e-commerce marketplaces (e.g. Amazon).
These platforms not only help consumers save on the cost of nding sellers, but also
often guide consumers toward better and more relevant products. For instance, person-
alized recommendation or ltering enables consumers to encounter and consider more
relevant products rst; using a better display technology or o¤ering customer reviews
I am grateful to Mark Armstrong and Yongmin Chen for their helpful comments.
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makes the inspection and comparison of products more informative. A related trend is
that sellers make use of consumer data (e.g. via data brokers or social media) to target
their ads and sometimes even o¤er personalized products. This also makes consumers
face a search pool with more relevant products.
In this paper we study how product information improvement a¤ects consumer
search, rm competition and consumer welfare. If product price is xed and if con-
sumers have no intrinsic privacy concerns, consumers should benet from the afore-
mentioned information improvement. However, sellers usually have incentives to adjust
their prices given that consumer search behavior is inuenced by the information envi-
ronment. This makes the impact of information improvement on consumers less clear.
We adopt the search framework developed in Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and
Renault (1999), and consider a large number of sellers, each supplying a horizontally
di¤erentiated product. A products match utility for a consumer is a random draw
from some distribution, and the realization is independent across products and con-
sumers. Consumers search sequentially for both better product match and lower price.
The details of the model are presented in Section 2. We do not model the source of
information improvement, but instead focus on an exogenous change of the information
environment and explore its market implications. We model the information change by
assuming that consumers face a di¤erent match utility distribution. Two leading cases
are when the match utility distribution becomes either higher in the sense of rst-order
stochastic dominance (FOSD) (e.g. when consumers face more relevant products), or
more dispersed in the sense of mean-preserving spread (MPS) (e.g. when the inspection
of each product becomes more informative). We aim to understand how such a change
of the match utility distribution a¤ects consumer search and the market performance.
In Section 3 we examine consumer search behavior. With improved information
consumers become choosier in the sense that they aim to nd a higher match utility
before they stop searching. That is, consumers set a higher reservation match utility
in their optimal stopping rule. This, however, does not necessarily imply that they
search longer, as with the new distribution they might be able to nd a high match
utility at each rm more likely (e.g. when the distribution becomes higher in the sense
of FOSD). We show that consumers search longer when the new distribution is such
that the expected benet from one more search becomes greater for any given level of
the best match utility so far in terms of percentile. This denes excess wealth order
in the stochastic order literature, a requirement stronger than MPS when the mean
remains unchanged. Simpler conditions are derived in special cases such as when the
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search friction is small or when the new distribution is a truncation of the original
one from below. Consumer search duration is important for an information platform
if its revenue is from charging sellers per-click fees, and it also a¤ects sellers pricing
incentive.
In Section 4 we study price. In our search model each rm acts as a local monopolist
facing consumers who regard the continuation value of search as their outside option.
The equilibrium price is then the reciprocal hazard rate of the match utility distribution
(which reects the demand composition) evaluated at the reservation match utility
(which captures consumer search incentive). A change of the match utility distribution
has both a demand composition e¤ect and a search e¤ect, but oftentimes they go
in opposite directions. For instance, when the distribution becomes higher in terms
of having a smaller hazard rate, the price would go up if the reservation match utility
remained unchanged, but meanwhile the fact that consumers set a higher reservation
match utility yields an opposite force to drive price down whenever the hazard rate
function is increasing. We show that rms price lower when the new distribution is such
that the expected benet from one more search becomes greater for any given level of
the best match utility so far in terms of hazard rate. As before, simpler conditions are
available in special cases. For instance, when the search friction is small, consumers
do not stop searching until they nd a match utility close to the upper bound. If
information improvement does not change this upper bound, both FOSD and MPS
induce a new distribution with higher density around the upper bound, so they have a
similar e¤ect on search and price. It is shown that both induce less search and a lower
market price. Search duration and price can move in the same direction more generally
when the match utility distribution changes. This contrasts with the usual perception
that they move in opposite directions (e.g. when consumers search less, rms compete
less intensely and so market price goes up).
In Section 5 we investigate consumer welfare. Consumers must benet from infor-
mation improvement if it induces a lower market price. More generally, we show that
information improvement benets consumers when the induced new distribution is such
that the expected benet from one more search becomes greater for any given level of
the best match utility so far in terms of virtual value (which is the match utility minus
the reciprocal of the hazard rate). When the new distribution is a truncation of the
original one from below, information improvement benets consumers regardless of its
impact on price (provided that the search market remains active). When the search
friction is small, if information improvement does not change the maximum possible
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match utility, both FOSD and MPS benet consumers since they reduce price. When
the search friction is relatively high, consumers can also su¤er from information im-
provement due to the rise of price. We conclude and discuss other possible ways to
model improved information in a search market in Section 6.
One branch of consumer search literature considers homogeneous products and aims
to explain price dispersion. The classic works include Diamond (1971), Varian (1980),
Burdett and Judd (1983), and Stahl (1989). They show that information heterogeneity
across consumers can generate price dispersion. The frameworks in those works, how-
ever, are not suitable for study product information improvement which motivates this
paper. The other branch uses a framework with di¤erentiated products which is more
suitable for studying our question. The classic works include Wolinsky (1986) and An-
derson and Renault (1999). This framework has been widely applied to study various
economic problems.1 Our paper can be regarded as a comparative static analysis with
respect to the match utility distribution in this framework, a question which has not
been studied systematically in the literature.
Special cases of a change of the match utility distribution have been studied in
various setups where a search engine controls the quality of displayed sellers (Eliaz and
Spiegler, 2011), or sellers or a search engine choose the degree of targeting in the context
of search advertising (de Corniere, 2016), or a platform chooses the match precision in
personalized recommendation (Zhong, 2018). We will discuss these existing works and
their connections in more detail in the next section. However, a common feature in
these works is that information improvement is modelled in a particular way so that
the hazard rate of the match utility distribution remains unchanged. According to our
analysis, this is crucial for their results that information improvement intensies price
competition unambiguously (when consumer search remains active). Our study is also
related to section 4 in Anderson and Renault (1999) which examines how the degree
of product di¤erentiation a¤ects price in a search market. They consider the Wolinsky
model with a nite number of rms and captures the degree of product di¤erentiation
by a multiplicative parameter in front of the match utility random variable. Given their
full-market coverage assumption, the change of product di¤erentiation is a special case
of the MPS relationship.
1They include, for example, prominence and ordered search (e.g. Armstrong et al., 2009), product
design and the long-tail phenomenon (e.g. Bar-Isaac et al., 2012), multiproduct search and retail
market structure (e.g. Zhou, 2014, and Rhodes and Zhou, 2019), price directed search (e.g. Choi et
al., 2018).
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2 The model
There is a continuum of rms, each supplying a di¤erentiated product at a constant
marginal cost normalized to zero. There is a continuum of consumers, each having at
most a unit demand for one of the products. We normalize the measure of consumers
per rm to one. Both rms and consumers are risk neutral, and each consumer has a
zero outside option. In the benchmark case, a products match utility for a consumer,
denoted by XF , is a random draw from a distribution with CDF F (x) and support
[xF ; xF ]. The realization of XF is assumed to be i.i.d. across consumers and products.
This implies that rms are ex ante symmetric.
We model an environment with improved information by assuming that consumers
face a new match utility distribution with CDF G(x). Let XG denote the associated
new random variable, and let [xG; xG] be the new support. Suppose both F and G are
di¤erentiable, and their associated densities are f and g, respectively. We often consider
the case where XG is an FOSD of XF (denoted by XG FOSD XF ) or the case where
XG is an MPS of XF (denoted by XG MPS XF ).2 FOSD captures the scenario when
the products in a consumers search pool become more relevant to the consumer. MPS
captures the scenario when the inspection of each product becomes more informative
so that the distribution of the estimated match utility becomes more dispersed. More
generally, we assume the following:
Assumption 1 XG is greater thanXF in the increasing convex order, i.e., E[(XG)] 
E[(XF )] for any increasing and convex function  whenever the expectations exist.
Note that XG is greater than XF in the increasing convex order if XG FOSD XF or
XG MPS XF .3
An implicit assumption in our model is that the improved search pool (even after
some less relevant products are removed, for example) still has many products, and the
products still appear symmetric ex ante to consumers. We will present examples later
where this assumption is plausible.
2Formally, XG FOSD XF if G(x)  F (x) for all x, andXG MPS XF if
R x
 1
G(~x)d~x  R x
 1
F (~x)d~x
for all x and the equality holds at x = maxfxF ; xGg.
3See, for example, section 4.A in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) for a comprehensive discussion
of the increasing convex order. It implies that a risk-seeking decision maker prefers XG over XF . An
alternative denition is that there exists a random variable Y such that XG FOSD Y MPS XH or
XG MPS Y FOSD XH .
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In either case, consumers initially have imperfect information about each products
match utility and price. They can, however, search sequentially to gather information:
by incurring a cost s > 0 a consumer can visit a rm and discover both its match utility
and price. During the search process, consumers know the common match utility distri-
bution across products and hold a rational belief of rms pricing strategy. Since there
are no common shocks across rms, we assume that upon observing an o¤-equilibrium
price in a rm, consumers believe that the other rms still adopt their equilibrium pric-
ing strategy. As standard in the consumer search literature (and reasonable for online
shopping, for instance), we also assume that consumers have free recall, i.e. they can
return to retrieve a product inspected before without paying an extra cost. Firms set
their prices simultaneously to maximize their own prot given their rational expectation
of consumer search behavior, and consumers search optimally given the match utility
distribution and their rational expectation of rms pricing strategy. In either case we
look for a symmetric equilibrium where all rms charge the same price and consumers
search actively and randomly. We aim to investigate how an improved search pool with
a new distribution G a¤ects consumer search behavior, market price and consumer
welfare.
In the following, we give a few examples which help connect our model with some
existing works.
(i) Quality control by search engines. Eliaz and Spiegler (2011) consider a variant
of the above Wolinsky model where each product is either a match or not for a con-
sumer, and conditional on being a match their match utility is a random draw from
a distribution with CDF, say, (x). Products di¤er in their quality, denoted by q, in
terms of their chance of being a match for a consumer, and the quality is unobservable
to consumers.4 The trade can take place only via a search engine which can control
the quality of rms displayed to consumers by setting a per-click fee. Since a higher-
quality rm is more willing to join, only the products with a quality above a certain
threshold, say, q^ will join and so be displayed to consumers. Consumers search in this
pool sequentially and randomly. This model di¤ers from ours as it has ex ante rm het-
erogeneity, but its feature of binary match outcomes ensures symmetric pricing across
rms, and so it is in fact the same as our model with F (x) = E[1   q + q(x)] and
G(x) = E[1  q + q(x)jq  q^], where the expectation is taken over q. Clearly here G
4This approach of modelling rm quality heterogeneity in a search framework is from Chen and He
(2011). A similar framework has also been used to study, for example, targeted search and product
design in Yang (2013), and search and quality investment in Chen, Li, and Zhang (2020).
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is an FOSD of F .
(ii) Targeted search advertising. de Corniere (2016) considers a Salop circular model
where both a continuum of rms/advertisers and a continuum of consumers are uni-
formly (but independently) distributed on the circle. In the benchmark, when a con-
sumer enters a query which reveals her taste location, the search engine displays all
the rms randomly to her, and the consumer then conducts a sequential search in a
random order. This is a spatial version of the Wolinsky model (and it was developed
in Wolinsky, 1983). More precisely, since the disutility of buying a non-ideal product
is assumed to be weakly convex in the distance between the consumers taste location
and the product location, the model is equivalent to the Wolinsky model with a weakly
increasing match utility density function f (so that 1   F is concave). de Corniere
is interested in the scenario where either the rms or a search engine can control the
match precision. In particular, if a rm chooses a match broadness d, it will appear
in a consumers search pool only if it is within the distance of d from the consumers
location. This is the same as the Wolinsky model with a truncated distribution where
a consumer sees a rm only if its match utility is above a threshold, say, x^. If all rms
choose the same threshold or the search engine sets the same threshold for all rms,
consumers infer that all the rms in their search pool have a match utility distribution
with CDF
G(x) =
F (x)  F (x^)
1  F (x^) :
Here G is also an FOSD of F .5
(iii) Filtering and elimination by aspects. Suppose each product has two attributes
and the match utility of a product for a consumer is X = X1+X2, where Xj is attribute
js match utility. Suppose X1 and X2 are independent of each other, and let Fj be the
CDF of Xj. A popular heuristic decision rule studied in psychology and behavioral
economics is elimination by aspects (e.g. Tversky, 1972). Suppose consumers are
able to lter products (e.g. via a product comparison website) according to attribute 1
and only consider those with X1 > x^1. Then all the products in the consumers search
5Zhong (2018) studies a similar search engine design problem in the Wolinsky (1986) framework.
He assumes that personalized recommendation leads to a truncated distribution. More generally we
can consider a targeting or recommendation technology by which the platform sees a signal of each
products match utility for a consumer and only displays to the consumer the products with a signal
above a certain threshold. When the signal has the standard monotone likelihood ratio property,
the distribution of the expected match utility of the displayed products is an FOSD of the original
distribution.
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pool have a match utility distribution
G(x) =
Z
F1(x  x2)  F1(x^1)
1  F1(x^1) dF2(x2) =
F (x)  F1(x^1)
1  F1(x^1) :
Here again G is an FOSD of F .
(iv) More informative inspections. Suppose that when a consumer inspects a prod-
uct, she learns a signal of the true match utility. The signal is precise with probability 
and a pure noise with probability 1  . Then conditional on a signal realization ~s, the
consumers estimate of the match utility is ~s+(1 ), where  is the mean of the true
match utility which is distributed according to (x). Suppose the inspection becomes
more informative in the sense that the signal precision rises from 1 to 2 (e.g. because
a comparison website starts o¤ering customer reviews or introducing 3D virtual online
shopping). This ts our model with
F (x) = 

x  (1  1)
1

and G(x) = 

x  (1  2)
2

:
In this example G is an MPS of F . Note that this relationship remains true more
generally whenever the signal becomes more informative in the Blackwell sense.
In sum, in examples (i)-(iii) information improvement leads to a more selective
(random) search pool, and in example (iv) information improvement leads to a more
informative (random) search pool.
For convenience, for a random variable X with CDF H(x), we write
E[(X   u)+] 
Z x
x
maxf0; x  ugdH(x) =
Z x
u
[1 H(x)]dx ; (1)
where the second equality is from integration by parts. This expression captures the
expected benet from an additional search when the match utility distribution is H
and the best match utility so far is u. We call the price which maximizes p[1  H(p)]
the standard monopoly price associated with the match utility distribution H.
In our analysis below we make the following technical assumptions:
Assumption 2 Both 1 F and 1 G are  1-concave (i.e., both 1=(1 F ) and 1=(1 G)
are convex), and the search cost s is less than mini=F;G E[(Xi  pMi )+], where pMi is the
standard monopoly price associated with distribution i.
It is ready to check that the assumption of  1-concavity is equivalent to both x  
1 F (x)
f(x)
and x  1 G(x)
g(x)
being increasing functions. As we will see, this ensures that the
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equilibrium price in each case is determined by the corresponding rst-order condition.
Notice also that the  1-concavity condition is weaker than the often assumed condition
in the literature that 1   F and 1   G are log-concave (or equivalently their hazard
rate functions are increasing),6 so it is satised by many often used distributions. As
we will explain later, the search cost condition ensures an active search market in each
case.
2.1 Some preliminaries
We now characterize the equilibrium of the case with distribution F . (The analysis for
the case of G is analogous.) Let pF denote the symmetric equilibrium price, and let rF
denote the reservation match utility which uniquely solves
E[(XF   rF )+] =
Z xF
rF
[1  F (x)]dx = s : (2)
When rms charge the same price, a consumer will then cease her search if and only if
the best match utility so far is greater than rF . Note that rF is interior (i.e. rF > xF )
under our search-cost assumption, so that some consumers will search beyond the rst
encountered rm.
It is convenient to denote by
F  F (rF )
the probability that in equilibrium a consumer will continue to search after visiting a
rm. We call it the search propensity. By changing the variable in (2) from x to
t = F (x), we can dene the search propensity directly as the solution toZ 1
F
1  t
f(F 1(t))
dt = s : (3)
Suppose now that a rm unilaterally deviates to price p. If a consumer comes to
visit it, she will stop searching and buy its product immediately if the match utility of
its product is such that XF   p > rF   pF , where the latter is the continuation surplus
if the consumer chooses to search on (which is also the equilibrium consumer surplus).
Hence, the rms deviation prot will be proportional to p[1   F (rF   pF + p)]. In
equilibrium the rm should have no incentive to deviate, which requires
pF =
1  F (rF )
f(rF )
: (4)
6Log-concavity is 0-concavity, and -concavity is more stringent than 0-concavity when  > 0.
See, e.g., Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991) for a detailed discussion of the concept of -concavity.
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This rst-order condition is also su¢cient for dening the equilibrium price when 1 F
is  1-concave.7 We can also express pF as a function of search propensity:
pF =
1  F
f(F 1(F ))
: (5)
Both expressions (4) and (5) for pF will be useful in the subsequent analysis.
Consumers are willing to participate into the market if rF   pF > 0, or equivalently
if rF   1 F (rF )f(rF ) > 0. Since the standard monopoly price pMF solves p =
1 F (p)
f(p)
, this
is equivalent to rF > p
M
F given the  1-concavity assumption. Therefore, from the
denition of rF we know that the primitive condition for an active market is s <
E[(XF   pMF )+], where the right-hand side is the consumer surplus in the monopoly
case.8 In this range of search costs, when s increases, the reservation match utility
rF becomes smaller and so does the search propensity. This increases the price if the
hazard rate function f
1 F
is increasing (or if 1   F is log-concave), but decreases the
price if the hazard rate function is decreasing (or if 1 F is log-convex). Under the  1-
concavity condition, however, an increase of s always lowers consumer surplus rF   pF ,
regardless of how price varies.
An analogous analysis for the case of G applies when s < E[(XG   pMG )+]. In
particular, the reservation match utility rG in the new case solves E[(XG   rG)+] = s
and the search propensity is G  G(rG). Then the new market price is
pG =
1 G(rG)
g(rG)
=
1  G
g(G 1(G))
: (6)
3 Consumer search behavior
We rst examine how information improvement a¤ects consumer search behavior. Given
XG is greater than XF in the increasing convex order, we have
E[(XG   u)+]  E[(XF   u)+] for any u (7)
since (X   u)+ is an increasing and convex function of X.9 That is, for any given best
match utility so far, the expected benet from one more search is greater in the case
7When 1   F is  1-concave, x   1 F (x)f(x) is an increasing function (or 2f2 + (1   F )f 0  0), and
then it is easy to check that a rms deviation prot is single-peaked at p = pF .
8When s is above this threshold, there will be no equilibrium with an active market. One way to
avoid that uninteresting outcome is to assume that the rst search is free. In that case, consumers will
always buy from the rst rm they encounter and each rm charges the monopoly price pMF .
9In fact (7) is an alternative denition of the increasing convex order, as any increasing convex
function can be approximated by a linear combination of (X   u)+ with di¤erent us.
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of G than in the case of F . From the denition of rF and rG, it is immediate that
consumers become choosy and set a higher reservation match utility in the case of G
(i.e., rF  rG).
This, however, does not mean that consumers necessarily search longer in the case
of G since the distribution changes at the same time. More precisely, the (expected)
consumer search duration is determined by the search propensity:
lF  1
1  F and lG 
1
1  G ; (8)
but how an information improvement a¤ects the search propensity is not that clear.
For example, when G is higher than F in the sense of FOSD, we have rG  rF but
meanwhile G(x)  F (x). That is, in the case of G consumers set a higher reservation
match utility but at the same time they are more able to nd a high match utility, so
that the comparison of search propensity F = F (rF ) and G = G(rG) can go either
direction.
The following result reports conditions for a clear-cut comparison of search duration.
Proposition 1 (i) Consumers search longer in search pool G (i.e. lF  lG) if XG is
greater than XF in the excess wealth order, i.e. if
E[(XG  G 1())+]  E[(XF   F 1())+] for any  2 (0; 1) . (9)
(ii) Suppose both f(xF ) and g(xG) are strictly positive. Then there exists s^ such that
for s < s^, consumers search longer in search pool G if and only if g(xG) < f(xF ).
Proof. (i) From (3) and its counterpart for G, we haveZ 1
F
1  t
f(F 1(t))
dt =
Z 1
G
1  t
g(G 1(t))
dt :
Then F  G (i.e. consumers search longer in the case of G) ifZ 1

1  t
f(F 1(t))
dt 
Z 1

1  t
g(G 1(t))
dt (10)
for any  2 (0; 1). This is an equivalent way to write condition (9) by changing variable
from x to F (x) or G(x).
(ii) It su¢ces to prove the result when s  0. Recall that F solves
R 1
F
1 t
f(F 1(t))
dt =
s. When s is close to zero, F is close to 1. Using the (second-order) Taylor expansion
11
and f(F 1(1)) = f(xF ) > 0, we can approximate the integral term on the left-hand
side as 1
2
(F   1)2=f(xF ). Then
1  F 
p
2sf(xF ) : (11)
Similarly, one can derive 1  G 
p
2sg(xG) when s is close to zero. Then the desired
result follows immediately.10
A result similar to result (i) has also been pointed out in Chateauneuf, Cohen and
Meilijson (2004) (see its section 2.3.4). Excess wealth order is one way to compare
the degree of variability of two random variables. It is location-free as only percentiles
matter.11 Notice that E[(XF  F 1())+] is the expected benet from one more search
in the case of F when the best match utility so far has reached the 100tth percentile.
So (9) means that when the best match utility so far has reached a given percentile,
the consumer has a higher incentive to search in the case of G than in the case of F .
When XF and XG have the same mean, excess wealth order implies MPS, the more
familiar concept for comparing dispersion.12 But unfortunately MPS is not su¢cient
for a clear-cut comparison result concerning search duration.13
Result (ii) is more intuitive to understand. When s is close to zero, consumers
will cease their search only if they nd a match utility close to the upper bound of the
distribution. Then basically the density of match utility at the upper bound determines
the likelihood of ceasing search. If F and G share the same upper bound x, both FOSD
and MPS imply that G(x)  F (x) for x close to x and so g(x)  f(x). Therefore, G
will induce consumers to search less when the search friction is small.
10For consistency we prove all the results for a small search friction in this paper by approximating
the search propensity. They can also be proven by approximating the reservation match utility.
11See Section 3.C in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) for a comprehensive discussion of the excess
wealth order.
12When two random variables have the same mean, excess wealth order therefore implies increasing
convex order. This, however, may not be true if they have di¤erent means. For example, suppose XF
is uniform on [0; 1] and XG is uniform on [k; 1] with k 2 (0; 1). It is easy to verify that XF is greater
than XG in the excess wealth order (i.e. XF is more dispersed), but XG is clearly greater than XF in
the increasing convex order since XG FOSD XF .
13Here is one counterexample: Suppose F has a triangle density on [0; 1] (i.e. F (x) = 2x2 for
x 2 [0; 12 ] and 1   2(1   x)2 for x 2 [ 12 ; 1]). Suppose G is the uniform distribution on [0; 1] and so it
is an MPS of F . When s < 112 , one can check that rF = 1   ( 32s)1=3 and rG = 1   (2s)1=2. Then
lF = [2(1  rF )2] 1 < lG = [1  rG] 1 if and only if s > 181 . In other words, whether consumers search
longer or not in the case of G depends on the magnitude of the search cost.
12
A su¢cient condition for (9) or (10) is f(F 1(t))  g(G 1(t)). One can check this
is equivalent to that G 1(t) F 1(t) increases in t, i.e., the quantile di¤erence between
XG and XF increases in t. This is the denition of XG being greater than XF in the
dispersive order.14 Then we have the following result:
Corollary 1 Consumers search longer in search pool G (i.e. lF  lG) if XG is greater
than XF in the dispersive order (i.e. if G
 1(t)  F 1(t) increases in t).
A similar result is also shown in Choi and Smith (2019). Dispersive order is another
way to compare dispersion. It is a stronger requirement than excess wealth order but
is also easier to check. One special case of dispersive order is that X +  is greater
than X in dispersive order for any constant  whenever   1. This implies, for
example, that if both F and G are normal distributions, consumers search longer in G
if it has a greater variance. (The way how Anderson and Renault, 1999, model product
di¤erentiation also belongs to this dispersive order relationship.)
Now we are ready to discuss whether consumers search longer or shorter in the four
examples we introduced before.
Corollary 2 In examples (i)-(iii), consumers search shorter in search pool G if 1  F
is log-concave and longer if 1   F is log-convex. In example (iv), consumers always
search longer in search pool G.
Proof. We use the dispersive order result in Corollary 1 to prove this result. In
examples (i)-(iii) we have
G(x) = kF (x) + 1  k (12)
for x in the support of G, where k > 1 is a constant. Then
G 1(t) = F 1(1  1  t
k
) (13)
for any t 2 (0; 1). One can check that F 1(t)   G 1(t) increases in t if kf(G 1(t)) >
f(F 1(t)) for k > 1, and otherwise decreases in t. Notice that kf(G 1(t)) = f(F 1(t))
at k = 1, and one can check that the derivative of kf(G 1(t)) with respect to k is
f(z) + k
f 0(z)
f(z)
1  t
k2
= f(z) +
f 0(z)
f(z)
[1  F (z)] ; (14)
14Dispersive order has been used to study various economics problems. See, for example, Ganuza
and Penalva (2010) for its application in information disclosure in auctions, Zhou (2017) and Choi,
Dai, and Kim (2018) for its application in oligopolistic competition.
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where z = G 1(t) and the equality used (13). When 1   F is log-concave, we have
f 2+(1 F )f 0  0 and so (14) is positive. Then F 1(t) G 1(t) increases in t and so F
is greater than G in the dispersive order. The opposite is true if 1  F is log-convex.15
In example (iv),XG can be written as kXF+(1 k), where k = E[j  ^]=E[] > 1.
Since dispersive order is location-free, XG is greater than XF in dispersive order and
so consumers search longer in the case of G.16
One implication of Corollary 2 is that if a platform aims to maximize consumer
search duration (e.g. because it makes money from per-click fees), it has an incentive to
make the search pool more informative as in example (iv), but not more selective as
in examples (i)-(iii) if the match utility distribution is regular in terms of log-concavity.
4 Market price
We now examine how information improvement a¤ects market price. (Prot comparison
is the same as price comparison since prot is proportional to price in our model given all
consumers buy in equilibrium.) A change of the match utility distribution often yields
two opposite forces on price. For example, suppose information improvement leads to a
higher distribution in terms of hazard rate (i.e. g(x)
1 G(x)
 f(x)
1 F (x)
). From (4) it is ready to
see that this increases the market price for a given reservation match utility. However, as
this improvement is a case of FOSD, we also have rG  rF and this is an opposite force to
lower the market price if the hazard rate functions are increasing. The price expression
in (5) helps illustrate a similar trade-o¤ when information improvement leads to a more
dispersed distribution in terms of dispersive order (i.e. g(G 1(t))  f(F 1(t))). This
increases the price for a given search propensity, but as this change induces a greater
search propensity as shown in Corollary 1, there is also an opposite force to lower the
price if the hazard rate functions are increasing. For this reason, it is often hard to
obtain a clear-cut result on how a change of the match utility distribution a¤ects price
in the Wolinsky model.
15One may wonder, given F 1(t)   G 1(t) < 0 in the examples (i)-(iii) and F 1(1)   G 1(1) = 0
(if the upper bound of the distribution support is nite), how F 1(t)   G 1(t) can be decreasing in
t. Notice, however, that the log-convexity of 1   F requires the support of the distribution have an
innite upper bound, in which case limt!1[F
 1(t) G 1(t)] should be  1.
16Notice that in example (iv) we have xG = 2x + (1   2) and so g(xG) = (x)=2, where  is
the density function of . Then g(xG) < f(xF ) and so the result here is consistent with result (ii) in
Proposition 1 when the search cost is small.
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The following result reports a few conditions for an unambiguous price comparison.
For convenience, let
F (x)  1  F (x)
f(x)
and G(x)  1 G(x)
g(x)
be the reciprocal hazard rate in the case of F and G, respectively. They are decreasing
(increasing) functions if and only if 1  F and 1 G are log-concave (log-convex).
Proposition 2 (i) Suppose both of the reciprocal hazard rates are monotonic. Price is
higher in search pool G (i.e. pF  pG) if
E[(XG    1G (p))+]  E[(XF    1F (p))+] for any p (15)
and at least one of the reciprocal hazard rates is decreasing. The opposite is true if one
of the two conditions is reversed.
(ii) Suppose XG is greater than XF in the hazard rate order (i.e. if G(x)  F (x))
or in the dispersive order. Then price is higher in search pool G if at least one of the
reciprocal hazard rates is increasing.
(iii) Suppose both f(xF ) and g(xG) are strictly positive. Then there exists s^ such that
for s < s^, price is higher in search pool G if and only if g(xG) < f(xF ).
Proof. (i) It is more convenient to prove this result by using the price expression
with the reservation match utility. Suppose F (x) is decreasing. Since pF = F (rF )
and pG = G(rG) and both F () and G() are monotonic functions, the denitions of
rF and rG imply that
E[(XG    1G (pG))+] = E[(XF    1F (pF ))+] :
On the other hand, letting p = pG in (15) yields
E[(XG    1G (pG))+]  E[(XF    1F (pG))+] :
Then we have
E[(XF    1F (pF ))+]  E[(XF    1F (pG))+]
or equivalently  1F (pF )   1F (pG). This implies pF  pG given F (x) is decreasing. (If
G(x) is decreasing, a similar argument applies by letting p = pF in (15).)
(ii) Suppose F (x) is increasing (and so is
1 t
f(F 1(t))
). Then following the discussion
in the beginning of this section, we have
pG = G(rG)  F (rG)  F (rF ) = pF
15
in the case of hazard rate order where we have rG  rF , and
pG =
1  G
g(G 1(G))
 1  G
f(F 1(G))
 1  F
f(F 1(F ))
= pF
in the case of dispersive order where we have G  F .
(iii) It su¢ces to prove the result when s  0. Notice that when  is close to 1 and
f(xF ) > 0, we have
1  
f(F 1())
 1  
f(xF )
by using the Taylor expansion. This, together with (11), implies that when s is close
to zero, we have
pF =
1  F
f(F 1(F ))

s
2s
f(xF )
:
Similarly,
pG 
s
2s
g(xG)
:
Then the desired result follows.
Notice that E[(XF    1F (p))+] is the expected benet from one more search in the
case of F when the best match utility so far has reached a certain level in terms of
hazard rate. There are no existing stochastic order concepts which imply (15). A
simple case where (15) holds is when information improvement does not change the
hazard rate of the match utility distribution (which is true in examples (i)-(iii) as we
show below). The second result follows the discussion in the beginning of this section:
when at least one of the reciprocal hazard rates is increasing, the two forces discussed
before will work in the same direction. The third result for a small s is intuitive. When
the search friction is small, consumers will not stop searching until nding an almost
perfect match. In other words, for each rm their marginal consumers have a match
utility close to the upper bound. The density of these marginal consumers essentially
determines rms pricing incentive.
In the case of small s, together with result (ii) in Proposition 1, we can conclude
that search duration and price move in the same direction, which is opposite to the
usual intuition from search models that price is higher (lower) when consumers search
less (more). Intuitively, when the match utility distribution becomes, for example, more
concentrated around the upper bound, it is as if products become less di¤erentiated.
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This induces consumers to search less, but at the same time price competition is inten-
sied. This intuition, however, is not always right if the search cost is not small as we
will see below.
A related observation is that if pF  pG for any permitted s, we must have lF  lG.
To see that, notice that di¤erentiating both (3) and its counterpart for G with respect
to s yields pF ( dFds ) = pG( dGds ) = 1, and so pF  pG implies  dGds   dFds . Since
F = G = 1 at s = 0 and both decrease in s, this leads to G  F and so search
duration is longer in the case of G for any permitted s.
Another implication of result (iii) in Proposition 2 is that if F and G share the same
upper bound x, G must induce a lower market price when s is small. This is because,
as we have pointed out before, both FOSD and MPS imply g(x)  f(x). However,
when F and G have di¤erent upper bounds (e.g. in example (iv)), the outcome can be
reversed as shown in the corollary below.
Corollary 3 In examples (i)-(iii), price and prot are lower in search pool G if 1  F
is log-concave and higher if 1   F is log-convex. In example (iv), price and prot are
higher in search pool G at least when the search cost is su¢ciently small.
Proof. In examples (i)-(iii), as we have known G(x) = kF (x) + 1   k for x in the
support of G, where k > 1 is a constant. Then we have
1 G(x)
g(x)
=
k(1  F (x))
kf(x)
=
1  F (x)
f(x)
;
and so the result follows from rG  rF . In example (iv), as we have pointed out before,
information improvement reduces the density of consumers at the top, so the result
follows from result (iii) in Proposition 2.
In the rst three examples the hazard rate of the match utility distribution remains
unchanged when information improves. This special property leads to a clear-cut price
and prot comparison result.17 When this property does not hold, however, information
improvement with XG FOSD XF can induce a higher market price even in the regular
case with log-concavity. Suppose F (x) = x and G(x) = x10. One can check, for
example, when s = 0:1, we have pG  0:52 > pF  0:45. (But given g(1) > f(1) > 0
in this example, price must go down with G if the search cost is su¢ciently small.) In
17Note that when 1   F is log-convex, it must be the case that f(xF ) = 0 and so result (iii) in
Proposition 2 does not apply. Thus, the result that price rises in the case of G in the rst three
examples does not contradict with Proposition 2.
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this example, we also have lG  1:16 < lF  2:22, so when the search cost is not small,
search duration and price can move in opposite directions.
In example (iv), the same result can hold even for a larger search cost. Consider
the uniform example with (x) = x. Then when the signal precision is , the CDF
is 1

 
x  1 
2

and it has support [1 
2
; 1+
2
]. One can check that the reservation match
utility is 1
2
(1 + )   p2s and the equilibrium price is p2s when s < minf 
2
; (1+)
2
32
g
(which is required by Assumption 1). Therefore, in this example price always increases
as information improves as long as the search market is active, and meanwhile consumers
search longer as we pointed out before.
If a platform aims to maximize industry prot (e.g. because it earns a percentage of
sellers prot by charging commission fees), it has no incentive to make the search pool
more selective as in examples (i)-(iii) when the distribution is regular,18 but often
has an incentive to make the search pool more informative as in example (iv).
5 Consumer surplus
In our setup total welfare is simply the reservation match utility. Hence, information
improvement must enhance total welfare when G is greater than F in the increasing
convex order. Since consumer surplus is the reservation match utility minus price,
information improvement must also benet consumers if it induces a lower price.
More generally, let us dene two virtual value functions:
F (x)  x 
1  F (x)
f(x)
and G(x)  x 
1 G(x)
g(x)
:
Then consumer surplus is F (rF ) and G(rG), respectively. (Recall that both of the
 functions are increasing given the  1-concavity assumption.) Similar results as in
Proposition 2 follow if we replace the  functions there by the  functions.
Proposition 3 (i) Consumers are better o¤ in search pool G if
E[(XG    1G (v))+]  E[(XF    1F (v))+] for any v : (16)
(ii) Suppose both f(xF ) and g(xG) are strictly positive. Then there exists s^ such that
18Notice, however, that the market is fully covered in our model due to the existence of an innite
number of rms, so the potential e¤ect of information improvement on consumer participation is
ignored.
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for s < s^, consumers are better o¤ in search pool G if and only if
xG   2
s
2s
g(xG)
> xF   2
s
2s
f(xF )
:
Note that E[(XF    1F (v))+] is the expected benet from one more search in the
case of F when the best match utility so far has reached a given level in terms of the
virtual value (x). There are no existing stochastic order concepts which imply (16).
As in the case of price comparison, a simple case where (16) holds is when information
improvement does not change the hazard rate function. Result (ii) follows immediately
from the proofs of result (ii) in both Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. It implies that
when the search cost is small and both F and G have the same upper bound, consumer
surplus comparison is simply the reverse of price comparison. However, the outcome
can be very di¤erent if F and G have di¤erent upper bounds. For instance, in example
(iv) information improvement can enhance both prot and consumer surplus.
Corollary 4 In examples (i)-(iii), consumers are better o¤ in search pool G. In ex-
ample (iv), consumers are better o¤ in search pool G at least when the search cost is
su¢ciently small.
Proof. In examples (i)-(iii), we have known that 1 F (x)
f(x)
= 1 G(x)
g(x)
. Then F (x) =
G(x) and so consumers must benet from information improvement given rF  rG and
F (x) is increasing. In example (iv), when s  0 one can check that consumer surplus
with signal precision  is approximately x+ (1  )  2
p
2s(x). This is increasing
in  when s is small.
Note that in examples (i)-(iii), given the  1-concavity condition, information im-
provement benets consumers regardless of how it a¤ects the price. The result in
example (iv) is not robust to a larger s. Consider the uniform example with (x) = x.
Following the analysis before, one can check that consumer surplus in this example,
when the signal precision is , is 1
2
(1 + )   2p2s, which increases in  if and only if
s < 
8
. Recall that our solution is valid when s < minf 
2
; (1+)
2
32
g, and this search cost cap
is greater than 
8
for any . Therefore, in this example, starting from any  improving
information benets consumers if s  
8
but harms consumers if 
8
< s < minf 
2
; (1+)
2
32
g.
That is, the negative price e¤ect dominates when the search cost is relatively high.
One implication of Corollary 4 is that if a platform aims to improve consumer
surplus (e.g. because it faces strong competition from other platforms), it has an
incentive to make the search pool more selective as in examples (i)-(iii) and also
more informative as in example (iv) at least when the search cost is small.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has studied how product information improvement a¤ects consumer search
duration, market price, and consumer welfare. Although in general the impact on each
variable can go either direction, we have derived conditions for an unambiguous assess-
ment. In particular, we show that when the search friction is small, search duration and
market price tend to move in the same direction, and information improvement benets
consumers if it does not change the maximum possible match utility. Our setup also
provides a unied perspective to consider various types of information improvement
which have been separately studied in the literature. This paper regards the infor-
mation improvement as exogenous. In practice, however, information improvement is
often strategically chosen by rms or information platforms. This lack of endogenous
information in our model clearly limits the relevance of our welfare assessments.
There are other possible ways to model improved information in a search market. For
example, Anderson and Renault (2000) model information improvement by assuming
that in the Wolinsky model some consumers become informed (i.e. they know the match
utilities of all the products) before search. Since these consumers have no incentives
to search beyond the best matched product which they already know, their presence
relaxes price competition and harms other uninformed consumers. This is similar as
making some consumers informed of their best matched products (e.g. due to a perfect
personalized recommendation). If all consumers are informed of their best matched
products, then they will not search beyond the recommended product, and due to
Diamond (1971)s argument each rm will act as a monopolist conditional on being the
best matched supplier.19 A more general approach is to assume that consumers are
informed of several top matched products (but without their ranking). Since the top
matched products have an improved conditional match utility distribution, the situation
is similar to the FOSD case in this paper. There is an extra complication, however, when
the total number of rms is nite: the (conditional) match utilities of the top products
are correlated and this causes signicant complexity in the demand analysis.20 It is also
19More precisely each rm will act a multiproduct monopolist which sells all the products in the
market. With an innite number of rms, this will lead to a price equal to the maximum match utility
and so the market will collapse unless the rst search is free. The outcome, however, will be very
di¤erent if each consumer is informed of the product with the highest surplus (i.e. match utility minus
price). In that case the outcome will be the same as in the perfect information case. See, e.g., Teh
and Wright (2019) for a model of recommendation with consumer search in this vein.
20A tractable case is studied in Burguet and Petrikaite (2019). They consider targeted advertising
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possible to consider information design in a search market. For example, Dogan and Hu
(2019) consider the same search framework and study how informative the inspection
of each product should be if we want to maximize consumer surplus. This is related
to example (iv) in Section 2 if we allow for a general signal structure. More broadly,
information design in a search market can consider not only the informativeness of each
product inspection, but also the disclosure of relative valuations across products, and
even the control of which sellers to display to consumers, of which Eliaz and Spiegler
(2011) and de Corniere (2016) are special cases.
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